Security

Your data, wherever it goes.

What stays on your computer, what travels end-to-end encrypted, what our cloud has to know, and every exception. Plain sentences, no badges. Experts: the algorithms are in the appendix at the end.

What runs where#

Shuriken is an app on your computers and servers, plus a small cloud that links them.

  • Your computers and servers

    Run the coding agents, hold your repositories and keep each chat's history. A server is a machine you add yourself.

  • What your agents can reach

    An agent works on your computer as you, with your access, like a CLI you run in a terminal. Your own chats are not sandboxed. So an agent can read what Shuriken keeps on that computer, and where the Shuriken app is signed in, that includes the key that opens your vault. A misled agent could then read every sign-in and key in it and act as you on your other computers and servers. On a Mac, an agent also gets the privacy permissions you gave Shuriken: Full Disk Access, the microphone and control of Terminal. macOS hands them to everything Shuriken starts, and any program running as you can borrow them through the Shuriken app. Full Disk Access is optional; without it macOS asks folder by folder. Run agents and prompts you trust.

  • Our cloud

    Signs you in, links your devices, relays sealed messages between them and sends push notifications. It stores no code and no chats readable, except, from an app or computer older than 5.1, a reply you type on a notification and a call from GitHub or an automation for your agents, which it holds until your computer picks them up, and what you choose to send us in a bug report (privacy policy).

  • Your AI provider

    Gets what your agent sends it, just as when you run its CLI in a terminal, under the account or key you added.

  • Your voice

    By default turned into text on your own computer by NVIDIA Parakeet, a speech model that runs there. With the local model no speech service or other third party hears it, and it works offline. From your phone or a browser it travels end-to-end encrypted to your computer first. If you pick a live speech provider (ElevenLabs, AssemblyAI, Deepgram, Speechmatics or OpenAI) and add your own key, your computer streams the audio to that provider under your account instead; silence is never sent, and the key sits in your vault or your computer's keychain, never in a log. The text then goes to your agent like anything you type.

  • Previews of dev servers

    A preview shows a dev server at its own address on shuriken.sh. Its pages are the code of whoever runs that dev server, not Shuriken, and they pass through our cloud without end-to-end encryption. A preview is private: it opens only for the account that runs it. Anyone else who opens its address sees that they don't have permission, with a button to sign in. Never type your Shuriken password on a preview page: it unlocks your vault.

What stays on your computer#

Your code and your chats are not sent to us. They live where your agents run.

  • Your code and files

    Repositories, project files and everything an agent writes stay on the computer or server the project is on. Shuriken copies none of it to our cloud. The two exceptions are a dev server preview you open through shuriken.sh and what you attach to a bug report.

  • Chat history

    Each chat's history is kept on the computer that runs it, by the agent's own tool and by Shuriken, as when you run the agent in a terminal. A phone, a browser or a desktop window keeps a copy of the chats it shows, on that device only.

  • What your agent sends its AI

    Prompts, code and tool output go from your computer straight to Anthropic, OpenAI, Google or the endpoint you chose, under your own sign-in or key. They never pass through our cloud. That provider's own terms cover what it keeps.

  • How it is stored there

    Chats, the queue, drafts, attachments and voice recordings are kept as ordinary files and app storage, protected by your user account and your disk's encryption, so turn on FileVault, BitLocker or your Linux disk encryption. Sign-ins and keys are the exception: Shuriken encrypts them with a key in your system's keychain, or, on a server without one, in a file only your user can read.

What our cloud stores sealed#

Messages between your devices are sealed with keys our cloud never holds. The rest is sealed on your devices under your vault key, and our cloud keeps a copy of that key (see Your vault): it stores ciphertext, but it could open it.

  • Messages between your devices

    Chats, the queue, changes and voice travel end-to-end encrypted. The relay can neither read nor forge them, with one exception: when you add a server by typing its code in an app instead of running the install command, your apps never trust that server's key (it shows as Not verified and gets nothing from them), but a server that never joined before takes your account's key from our cloud unchecked. A changed cloud could take that server over at that moment. The install command proves both keys, so use it.

  • Sign-ins and keys

    Source sign-ins, API keys and MCP sign-ins sit in your vault, encrypted before they leave your device. Our cloud stores them as ciphertext and holds a key that opens them (see Your vault). One exception, on Pro: when another Shuriken account keeps the same ChatGPT account signed in alongside yours, and “Keep each other signed in” is on (it starts on), your app shows our cloud that sign-in's identity token about once a day, so OpenAI's signature can confirm it is the same account. It says who signed in; it cannot be used to reach the account. Our cloud sees it in readable form for that check and does not store or log it. Nothing is sent while no one else keeps the account up, on Free, or once you stop keeping each other signed in. A Claude sign-in is never sent to us.

  • Your vault

    Your sign-ins and keys are stored in your account, encrypted, and open on every device you sign in on. The vault key is made at random, and our cloud keeps it two ways: locked by a key your device makes from your password (or by your recovery key), and locked by a key of our own that our database does not hold. The second copy is why signing in with Google, Apple, an email code or your password opens your vault with nothing asked. It also means our cloud can open your vault: whoever holds both our database and our server keys could read it. Our cloud opens it only to hand the key to your own signed-in devices. A copy of our database alone opens nothing.

  • Your names and pictures

    Project names, device names, pictures and your app settings are sealed too, under keys made from your vault key, with two exceptions. A server's name is sent readable when it joins, and stays readable until one of your apps sees it and seals it. And a few switches our cloud acts on itself stay readable, such as the language of its alerts and whether it may mail you about limit resets.

  • Push notifications

    What your computers send is sealed to your phone. The few alerts the cloud sends itself name nothing, like "A device is offline".

What our cloud must know#

Some things have to be readable for the service to work. This is all of it; the privacy policy says how long each one stays.

  • Your account

    Your email address, first name, plan and the terms you accepted. With two-factor sign-in on, its secret too: our cloud checks your codes with it, so it keeps it sealed with a key of its own that our database does not hold, so a copy of the database can not open it. If we set up an account for you and you never claim it, it is deleted 30 days after our last link to you expires, with the gift and our note about it.

  • Your devices

    Each device's kind, model, system and rough location, so you can tell them apart in Settings › Devices, plus when each was last seen and, for a browser, which browser it is.

  • What you send us

    Bug reports, with their screenshots, and mail to office@shuriken.sh.

  • What the relay sees

    Which of your devices connect to each other, when, for how long and about how much they send, the network address each one connects from, and what a connection proves when it starts: your account's public key, or which shared project or lent source it is for and whose key asks. Between current apps and servers, sizes are rounded up to a step and nothing is compressed before it is sealed. Not what they say.

  • Free limit resets

    When Claude or Codex gives one of your accounts a free limit reset, your computer tells us four things: the provider, what it refills, when it expires and a salted hash of it, so we can e-mail you once. Only with Share anonymous reset sightings on (Settings, on by default) does it add a fifth, the plan type (such as Pro or Max), and we count the reset on the public limit reset tracker: no account, device or address. Never a sign-in or a usage figure.

  • Claude Code usage dashboard

    If you run the usage dashboard's command, your computer encrypts the report before it sends it, with a key that stays in your link, so we keep a report we cannot read for 30 days, or until you delete it. Apart from that, a count per day of how often the tool was used, kept 400 days: nothing about you or any report. No network address is stored, only the keyed form our abuse limits use.

  • Which sources you have

    The kind of each item in your vault and which provider it is for, such as a Claude account or an OpenAI key, so an app can count them before you unlock it. Not the sign-in or the key. When a source signs out, the provider and the problem, so we can tell you. For a connected GitHub, which organisation.

  • Which of your computers share a network

    For Wake-on-LAN, codes that tell us which of your computers sit on the same network, so one can wake another. They are made with a key only your devices hold: we can compare them, not read the network. The computers' local addresses and their network cards' addresses reach us sealed. A computer on a version before 5.1 sent them readable; updating it clears them.

  • Which repository a project is

    A fingerprint of each project's git remote, so a call from GitHub reaches the right project. Its only salt is your account's id, which we know, so we could test it against any repository we can name, such as a public one. The project's name, folder and remote themselves are sealed.

  • People you share with

    The address you invite to a shared project and the role you give them, and which accounts share a project or a source with you. The project's name and folder reach them sealed, and the invite mail does not name the project.

  • When work happens

    Which of your devices are online, and in which hours work ran on them, kept for two days. Never what ran.

  • Billing

    Your Stripe customer, orders and invoices: name, address, VAT number and amounts. Stripe takes your card; we never see its number.

  • How you found us

    The campaign or website that sent you, if any; the details are cleared after 12 months. Our own count of visits uses no cookies. With your yes in the cookie banner, Google, Meta and Reddit may set an advertising cookie to see which ad brought you here; without it nothing of theirs loads.

  • Webhooks and notification replies

    When GitHub or one of your automations calls Shuriken, our cloud receives that message readable. For a computer on Shuriken 5.1 or later it seals the message to that computer's key before keeping it, so what waits for your computer (at most 7 days) and our host's restore points (up to 30 days after that) hold only ciphertext. For an older computer it keeps the message readable that long. A reply you type on a phone notification is sealed on your phone to your computer's key, so our cloud never reads it, unless the phone or the computer is older than 5.1: then it travels like an older computer's webhook.

  • What it never gets

    Your password and your card number. Your vault key it holds only locked (see Your vault). Your chats, prompts, code and transcripts only reach it sealed, apart from the exceptions this page names: a preview, a webhook, a notification reply from an app, or to a computer, older than 5.1, the Pro check under Sign-ins and keys, and a bug report.

Who else touches your data#

The companies Shuriken works with, and what each one gets.

  • Cloudflare

    Hosts our cloud and this website. It carries everything our cloud can read, the ciphertext of everything it can't, and the network addresses you connect from; the encryption between your browser and us ends at Cloudflare. It also runs the human check on the sign-in page when one is needed.

  • Stripe

    Takes payments. It gets your card, billing name and address, email and VAT number.

  • Resend

    Delivers the mail we send: sign-up, one-time codes, password resets, invites, receipts and news. It sees your address and the text of each mail.

  • Apple, Google and your browser's push service

    Deliver push notifications. They get a push token and, from your computers, sealed pushes they cannot read. The few alerts our cloud sends itself name nothing, like "A device is offline".

  • Your AI and speech providers

    Anthropic, OpenAI, Google or the endpoint you add get what your agents send, from your computer, under your own sign-in or key. A live speech provider you pick gets your dictation audio the same way.

  • Ad platforms, only with your yes

    Google, Meta and Reddit, and only if you allow advertising in the cookie banner. Then their tag on this website sets a cookie and learns which of our ads brought you here, the page you are on, your network address and browser, and whether you downloaded Shuriken. If you have the download link mailed to your computer, Meta also gets a hash of your address, never the address itself. Without your yes nothing of theirs loads. Nothing from the apps reaches them.

  • No trackers in the apps

    No third-party analytics or crash-report service runs in the apps or on your computers or servers. On this website, with your yes in the cookie banner, Google, Meta and Reddit may set an advertising cookie to see which ad brought you here; without it nothing of theirs loads. Our own count of website visits uses no cookies.

Signed code#

Once Shuriken is installed, a changed cloud cannot slip code onto your computers and servers. A browser is the exception.

  • Apps carry their own code

    The desktop app never loads code from our cloud.

  • The first download

    The first copy of the desktop app comes from our cloud: the installers on our download page and the one-line Mac installer. Nothing on your computer checks it against our release key, so a changed cloud could hand a new user a different installer. Once installed, the app takes only updates signed with that key, which the cloud never holds.

  • Servers take signed releases only

    Every release is signed with a key the cloud never holds. A server installs and updates only a release that signature checks out for.

  • A locked-down web app

    The web app runs under a strict content security policy: only the scripts it ships with, and no eval. That policy comes from our cloud too, so it stops a tampered file, not a changed cloud.

  • In a browser

    In a browser, the web app's code comes from our cloud each time you open it. A changed cloud could serve a page that reads what that tab opens: the password you type to sign in, your vault key and your chats. Our apps check the web app against a signed list of its files, but that check cannot see what a single browser gets. The sign-in, sign-up and password reset pages are not on that list at all. For anything sensitive, use the desktop app.

Sharing#

Live collaboration is coming soon.

  • Shared projects

    When live collaboration ships, members' turns will run on the owner's computers and the owner's sources, and the owner will never receive a member's sign-ins. Anyone you share a project with will get the same access you have: your computer and your sources. Share only with people you trust fully. Before a member first reaches the owner's computers, their app will show the owner's key and wait for their OK. Compare it with the owner first: our cloud lists that key, so that is the one moment it could put itself in between.

  • Lending a source

    Your sign-in or key is not sent to the people you lend to. Their chats use it through your computer, end-to-end encrypted. Stop lending and it ends at once. Your computer handles what they send to the AI; our cloud cannot read it.

  • Two people on one source

    When another Shuriken account signs in to the same Claude or ChatGPT account as you, your app tells you once. Neither of you is sent the other's sign-in.

  • Provider terms

    Some providers don't allow sharing a subscription sign-in. Lend an API key where you can.

How long we keep it#

  • While you have an account

    Your account, devices, vault and settings stay until you remove them or delete your account.

  • Shorter

    Which hours work ran: 2 days. Expired links: 1 day after they expire. GitHub deliveries: 30 days. Usage dashboard reports: 30 days, their daily counts 400 days. Bug reports and their screenshots: 24 months. Support mail: 3 years after the last message.

  • Restore points

    Our host keeps restore points of our databases and of your sync service for 30 days. Something we delete stays in them until they age out.

  • Kept by law

    Orders, invoices and withdrawals are kept for 10 years, as accounting law asks. Deleting your account removes their link to it.

  • Your copy

    Settings › Account › Export my data gives you what our cloud holds about you, including the mail you exchanged with us.

If something goes wrong#

  • A lost or stolen device

    Remove it in Settings › Devices on any other device and confirm with your password. Its sign-in stops working and its connections through our cloud close at once. The password step is what cuts off its keys: your vault gets a new key that only your other devices receive, so the copy on the lost device opens nothing saved after, and your computers close its sessions and stop accepting it, on your own network too, as soon as they read the change (right away when they are online, otherwise when they next reach our cloud). Removed without your password, for example from the device-limit screen, it keeps that key until you enter your password, which every signed-in app then asks for. Sign-ins and API keys it already held keep working at their providers until you change them there, and so do its GitHub and MCP sign-ins and any keys in project variables: sign out of each at its provider and replace each key. Shuriken lists them when you remove the device in Settings › Devices.

  • Someone else may have your password or a signed-in session

    Change your password in Settings › Account, or turn on two-factor sign-in there, and leave “Sign out all other devices” ticked. Or use Sign out everywhere else in Settings › Devices. Every other app and browser is signed out at once and needs your password (and code) to get back in. Your servers stay connected: remove any you don't recognise in Settings › Devices. Signing out does not take back a vault key a device already had; removing that device with your password does.

  • Signing in on a computer that isn't yours

    Answer No to “Is this your computer?”. Your sign-in there ends when you quit the browser, unless the browser restores your last session, and always after 2 hours without use. Your account key, your chats and your profile picture stay only in the open tab, never on that computer's disk. Your drafts and the browser's own history do stay, so sign out when you are done, or use a private window.

  • Deleting your account

    Settings › Account › Delete account mails you a one-time link. Open it and confirm, and your account and its data are removed from our cloud. Backups age out within 30 days. What stays: orders, invoices and withdrawals for 10 years, no longer linked to you; mail you exchanged with us for 3 years; and, if you unsubscribed from our news or marked it as spam, your address on the list we never send news to.

Reporting a vulnerability#

Write to office@shuriken.sh. The same address is in our security.txt.

  • What helps

    What you found, how to reproduce it, and what it lets someone do. A screenshot or a short script is welcome.

  • What we ask

    Test with your own accounts and touch no more data than you need to prove it, never other people's accounts or data. Please give us time to fix it before you publish. We reply to every report.

  • Rewards

    We credit a valid major security bug, rated critical or high, with a few months of Pro, decided by severity. There is no cash bounty. Minor issues are welcome too, but they are not rewarded.

  • When this page is wrong

    If Shuriken does something this page says it doesn't, that is a vulnerability too. Tell us.

For security engineers#

The design in detail: the algorithms, how each key is made, and what each side holds. The whole system, with diagrams and the code that does it, is on How the encryption works.

  • Password and sign-in

    PBKDF2-SHA256 over your password and a 16-byte salt, 600,000 rounds, gives a 256-bit password key on the device. HKDF-SHA-512 of it gives the sign-in key that apps send instead of the password; our cloud stores PBKDF2-SHA256 of that, 100,000 rounds. A vault not yet moved to 600,000 rounds uses 310,000. An account that has not signed in on a current app keeps an older record, PBKDF2-SHA256 at 100,000 rounds over the password, until it does.

  • The vault

    A random 256-bit vault key, made on a device. Each item is AES-256-GCM under it with a fresh 12-byte IV, and names its own id and kind inside the ciphertext, so it opens in no other slot. The server stores the vault key wrapped with AES-256-GCM under each way in: the password key or the recovery key. Removing a device with your password rotates the vault key and encrypts every item again.

  • Keys made from the vault key

    HKDF-SHA-512, a separate label each: the account key (Ed25519), which signs every device's keys, each relay handshake and every grant; the inbox key (X25519) for sharing; the documents key, for settings your computers also read, sealed with XSalsa20-Poly1305; and the pictures key. The server holds public halves and signatures only.

  • The relay

    Each computer has an X25519 key whose public half the account key signs. A connection runs a handshake shaped like Noise NK: X25519 ephemeral-static and ephemeral-ephemeral, HKDF-SHA-512 to one key per direction, frames sealed with XSalsa20-Poly1305 under a counter nonce. Sessions are forward secret once both ephemeral keys are gone. Frames are padded inside the encryption to multiples of 256 bytes up to 16 KiB, then of 4 KiB.

  • Push

    A computer seals a push to the phone's own P-256 key, after checking that key's account-key signature: ECDH, HKDF-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM.

  • Releases

    Releases and the web app's list of files are signed with Ed25519 keys kept off our servers. Apps and servers carry the public halves and check every update against them.

Keys: what your devices make, and what our server holds Figure 1. Your password never leaves your device. Everything our cloud holds for your vault is on the right; without your password, none of it opens. On your devices In our cloud Your password Typed on your device Password key PBKDF2-SHA256, 600,000 rounds Sign-in key HKDF-SHA-512 of the password key Hash of the sign-in key PBKDF2-SHA256, 100,000 rounds Vault key Random 256 bits, made on a device Vault key, locked Wrapped by the password key Vault items AES-256-GCM, a fresh IV per write Ciphertext only No key here opens it Account key and others HKDF-SHA-512 of the vault key Public halves and their signatures Never sent Salt and round count only Keys: what your devices make, and what our server holds Figure 1. Your password never leaves your device. Everything our cloud holds for your vault is on the right; without your password, none of it opens. On your devices Your password Typed on your device In our cloud: Never sent Password key PBKDF2-SHA256, 600,000 rounds In our cloud: Salt and round count only Sign-in key HKDF-SHA-512 of the password key In our cloud: Hash of the sign-in key Vault key Random 256 bits, made on a device In our cloud: Vault key, locked Vault items AES-256-GCM, a fresh IV per write In our cloud: Ciphertext only Account key and others HKDF-SHA-512 of the vault key In our cloud: Public halves
Figure 1. Your password never leaves your device. Everything our cloud holds for your vault is on the right; without your password, none of it opens.
A connection through our relay Figure 2. A connection through our relay. The two ends make session keys the relay cannot derive. It forwards sealed frames and sees the handshake, who connects, when, and how big each frame is, to the step. Your phone or browser Our relay Your computer Hello: ephemeral X25519 key, signed by your account key Ready: the computer's ephemeral X25519 key Session keys HKDF-SHA-512 (es, ee) No session keys It cannot derive them Session keys HKDF-SHA-512 (es, ee) Frames: XSalsa20-Poly1305, padded The relay sees The handshake, who, when, size steps A connection through our relay Figure 2. A connection through our relay. The two ends make session keys the relay cannot derive. It forwards sealed frames and sees the handshake, who connects, when, and how big each frame is, to the step. Your app Our relay Your computer Hello: ephemeral X25519 key, signed by your account key Ready: the computer's ephemeral X25519 key Session keys HKDF-SHA-512 (es, ee) Session keys HKDF-SHA-512 (es, ee) Frames: XSalsa20-Poly1305, padded The relay sees The handshake, who, when, size steps No session keys
Figure 2. A connection through our relay. The two ends make session keys the relay cannot derive. It forwards sealed frames and sees the handshake, who connects, when, and how big each frame is, to the step.

About closed source#

Shuriken's source code is not public. We know that asks you to take more on trust.

  • What we do instead

    We describe the design on this page precisely enough to hold us to it, we list what is not end-to-end encrypted instead of leaving it out, and we answer every report.

  • What you can check yourself

    The web app runs in your browser, so its code and its traffic are open to your browser's developer tools. After a short handshake, what it sends your computers is sealed bytes, and your password is not in anything it sends.

  • The code that encrypts

    The files that do the encryption are on How the encryption works, read from our repository each time this site is built, with the commit they came from.

Questions about your data?

Read the privacy policy, or ask us directly.